Vendor relationships4 min readAs of Q1 2026

Superseded: vendor propensity scores across the credit-union system, Q1 2026

Superseded. These are counts of a buying-propensity scorecard that was later tested against announced vendor adoptions and did not rank them.

Published · Computed from the quarterly panel by the CUSignals pipeline and reviewed before publication.

Superseded, September 2, 2026. The counts below are counts of a buying-propensity scorecard's own output. That scorecard was later tested against vendor adoptions that credit unions announced publicly, and it did not rank them. Take one credit union that announced an adoption and one that did not. In two yearly test groups, the score ranked the adopter higher only 51 and 54 times out of 100 pairs. That is a coin flip. Ranking by asset size alone got 68 and 67. The technical figures are on the disclosures page. Read the tables here as a record of how one score was spread in Q1 2026. They do not measure who was about to buy. This quarterly series is discontinued, and nothing replaces it in the same shape. What replaced the scorecard reports observed relationships: which credit union runs which platform, and since when. A register like that has no quarterly count to publish.

Scores by category

As of Q1 2026, the panel (our quarterly dataset of credit-union financials) held 2,405 credit unions above $50.0M in assets. The table counts how many scored 60 or higher in each category. The scorecard treated 60 as the point where a sales conversation was worth having this quarter. The test described above found no support for that. Digital banking and engagement had the most, with 69 institutions.

CategoryScoring 60+Share of universeMedian propensity
Lending / loan origination271.1%11
Collections, fraud and risk241.0%5
Digital banking and engagement692.9%1
Treasury and liquidity150.6%5
Core and reg-tech321.3%0

Propensity was never a stated intention. The scorecard read each balance sheet for patterns it assumed come before a purchase in a category. One was a loan book growing faster than the staff who approve loans. Another was delinquency rising before collections capacity does. A third was assets nearing a size that changes what a credit union must report. The test found that these patterns did not rank the credit unions that went on to buy.

Top-scoring category per institution

For each credit union, the scorecard also picked the category where it scored highest. It offered that category as the best way in, a claim that rests on the same failed scores. This is how those top categories were spread:

Entry categoryInstitutionsShare
Lending / loan origination85035.3%
Collections, fraud and risk55022.9%
Digital banking and engagement36915.3%
Treasury and liquidity35914.9%
Core and reg-tech27311.4%

Scores by asset tier

Budget and the propensity score are different things. A tier could score high and still buy nothing. The score looked for signs of need in the balance sheet, not for budget or buying authority.

Asset tierInstitutionsCategory scores 60+Median propensity
$50M-$100M577160
$100M-$500M1,070412
$500M-$1B284407
$1B-$10B450665
>$10B2446

What changed this quarter

CategoryLast quarterThis quarterChange
Lending / loan origination5427-27
Collections, fraud and risk6124-37
Digital banking and engagement6669+3
Treasury and liquidity2515-10
Core and reg-tech5132-19

The scorecard was built on the idea that movement matters more than level for a sales team. Credit unions that newly crossed 60 were meant to be fresh leads. Because the scores did not rank buyers, these changes describe the score, not a shift in demand.

How the score is built

Each of the five categories had its own scorecard. Each read balance-sheet changes that were assumed to come before a purchase in that category. Scores were set against the median of each credit union's peer group, not against fixed values. So a $90M credit union and a $4B one were each compared with their own peers, not with each other. Each scored account carried a plain-English note naming the changes behind its score.

This post reports on the system as a whole. By design, it names no credit union.

Caveats

Every figure above is a model estimate computed from the quarterly panel as of the quarter named at the top of this post. Scores are not investment, credit or merger advice, and nothing here is a recommendation about any institution. The scorecards, their published weights and their known limitations are set out in the disclosures.

See this in your own territory

Which institutions run which platforms, since when, and when a contract plausibly comes up — plus the test that found financials cannot predict a purchase. The ranked, named list behind this analysis — with the reason each institution scored where it did — is what a subscription opens. See the pricing ladder, or email admin@infinidatum.net with a question about this post.

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Figures in this post are model estimates computed from the quarterly panel as of the date shown. They are not investment, credit or merger advice and not a recommendation about any institution. See the disclaimer and disclosures. You may quote and cite this post with attribution and a link — see content use.